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Abstract
Good governance has become a prominent topic on the development agendas of national governments,
regional institutions and international organisations. There is common understanding that it is an imperative
for development. This article discusses two success stories, those of Finland and Singapore, and their road to
good governance. The analysis shows that historical, cultural and structural contexts have a major effect on
the success of anti-corruption policy. Finland is clearly an evolutionary case with a low-profile good
governance policy, whereas Singapore is a revolutionary case with an array of institutionalised anti-
corruption measures. This implies that there is no universal recipe for success in curbing corruption, but
rather processes which may vary considerably and yet be equally successful. The cases of Finland and
Singapore may be an important source of inspiration and policy-relevant information, but anti-corruption
policy and measures as such must be created taking due account of local history and culture.
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Introduction
Good governance has become a prominent topic on the development agendas of national
governments, regional institutions and international organisations. There is a common
understanding that its absence is a major cause of slow economic and social development. Thus it is
only natural that good governance has become one of the key issues in promoting economic,
political and social life by responsible organisations at different institutional levels.
Improvement in public governance has become a key element of the paradigm shift in the sense that
in international development cooperation there is a gradual shift from donor-determined
conditionality to a general emphasis on good governance as a precondition for sustainable economic
development. The message is that any country trying to escape poverty must take the issue of good
governance seriously.
2The most widely discussed topic under the good governance umbrella is arguably corruption. The
historical roots of combatting corruption are practically as long as human civilisation itself (Caiden,
2013a, 95). Such efforts intensified in the post-war years, especially when the view of corruption
was broadened from legal framework and public sector ethics to economic development and
international development aid. The normative concept of good governance emerged on the high
level political agenda in the late 1980s and has remained there ever since as a discourse on the
preconditions for development in the developing country context. It was further broadened and
intensified  due  to  the  Asian  financial  crisis  of  1997-98  and  the  liquidity  and  credit  crunch  of  the
latter  half  of  2000s,  to  serious  failures  of  corporate  governance  such  as  the  cases  of  Enron  and
Lehman Brothers, and to large-scale government failures such as the economically and politically
devastating politics of George W. Bush’s administration in the USA throughout the 2000s and bad
economic policy, corrupted and inefficient tax authorities and widespread tax evasion in the case of
Greece,  to name just a few notorious examples. Corruption is a critical development issue in East
and West alike.
While designing anti-corruption policies it is good to remember that there are also fairly clean
countries, whose stories are worth sharing as they provide inspiration and knowledge for policy-
makers, public managers and anti-corruption agencies. In this article we will discuss two country
cases that may serve such a purpose.
Objective, methodology and structure
This article discusses the variations of determinants of clean governance using two examples,
Finland and Singapore. Attention is paid to the role of cultural background, democracy, political
leadership and administrative machinery – including anti-corruption agency – in combatting
corruption in these two national contexts. The reason for choosing these two is that they represent
utterly different cases among the high-ranked countries of Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception  Index  (CPI)  ranking,  the  one  being  a  Nordic  welfare  society  and  the  other  an  Asian
developmental state. They have also shown durability in this respect, for they were already among
the least corrupt countries in the mid-1990s, when Transparency International started to publish its
corruption index. Even if there is good reason to be cautious with developing countries’ chances to
emulate the success recipes of historically unique cases, we may see in Finland and Singapore
illustrative benchmark cases when considering the approaches to good governance and anti-
3corruption policy in particular. (On success and failure in curbing corruption in different countries,
see Caiden, 2013a; 2013b).
Methodologically this article is based on historical analysis (Gardner, 2006), which establishes a
contextual setting from which two ideal types of ethics management models are derived (see
Hekman, 1983; Brewer, 2003). Two ideal types are constructed on the basis of empirical accounts
of  the  cases  of  Finland  and  Singapore  in  order  to  highlight  their  most  prominent  features.  They
represent two utterly different societal and historical contexts. This helps to assess the applicability
of these two cases to other national contexts, by comparing the respective ideal types and assessing
their potential applicability to different contexts. That said, it must be born in mind that we are not
talking about a simple transfer of the anti-corruption policies, organisations or actions of two model
countries to other contexts. Rather, this discussion provides only an extra element of the knowledge
base to be utilised in the policy-making and learning processes relating to good governance policy
in the given context.
The following discussion starts with the theoretical framework, which builds a conceptual basis for
understanding the origins and the key dimensions of the concept of good governance. After this two
policy-relevant  issues  are  discussed.  First,  what  is  meant  by  corruption  and  what  its  major
consequences are, and second, how to combat corruption and thus promote clean governance to the
benefit of society. To illustrate the policy variations, we present the two abovementioned country
cases, which are used to analyse how contextual differences affect the premises, forms and
outcomes of anti-corruption policy, and how contextual differences should be taken into account in
explaining, designing and evaluating such policy.
The concept of good governance
Governance is a generic term that refers to the manner in which organisations interact with their key
stakeholder groups in order to achieve their goals. In the public domain the concept of governance
or ‘public governance’ refers to governments’ goal-oriented interaction with various stakeholder
groups from the public, for-profit and non-profit sectors in democratic decision-making processes,
public service delivery and development activities. Good governance entails certain principles of
decision-making and conduct of public affairs – such as transparency, efficiency and accountability
- that apply to all the processes that constitute public sector operations and related interactions. As a
discourse it has a special meaning derived from governance challenges in development policy and
development aid frameworks (Anttiroiko and Valkama, 2005).
4The currently used term good governance was introduced in the late 1980s in the World Bank’s
report on Sub-Saharan Africa, emanating from the discussions about the crisis of governance. This
was the context in which a normative dimension addressing the quality of governance was brought
to light (Santiso, 2001, p. 5). In the 1990s the OECD started to widen its anti-corruption activities
towards the promotion of good governance (OECD, 2000). Due to such influential contributions
good governance became one of the dominant topics in global development discourse.
Concerning the core concept, the World Bank Institute has distinguished the following six
constitutive elements of good governance: voice and accountability, effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and control of corruption (Santiso, 2001, p. 5; cf.
World Bank Institute, 2005). Fairly similar definitions have been provided by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB, 1995), the OECD (2005) and the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2005). (See Figure 1).
Aspects and
dimensions
of good
governance
Administrative
dimension
Legal
dimension
Political
dimension
Consensus
oriented
Participatory
Responsive
Equitable and
inclusive
Effective and
efficient
Transparent
Accountable
Follows the
rule of law
Figure 1. Characteristics of good governance. (Modified from UNESCAP, 2005).
To  summarise,  good  governance  refers  to  a  specific  quality  of  institutional  arrangements  and
interactions between public organisations and stakeholders in public policy processes. This quality,
the ‘goodness’, is needed to ensure that government cost-effectively brings maximum benefit to the
people it serves and to society as a whole. Hence the connection with the idea of government’s need
and ability to create public value (Moore, 1995; cf. Roy, 2005).
5Consequences of corruption
Good governance discourse has traditionally revolved around corruption, and even today curbing
corruption is at the very core of the policies for good governance – and for a good reason.
Corruption has  long  historical  roots.  It  exists  in  some  form  in  every  society.  Corruption  is
conventionally understood as the private wealth-seeking behaviour of someone who represents the
public authority. A well-known metaphorical corruption formula is C  =  M  +  D  –  A, in which
corruption (C) equals monopoly power (M) plus discretion by civil servants (D) minus
accountability (A), which highlights key aspects of corruption-inviting setting in the public domain
(Klitgaard, 1998; McCusker, 2006, p. 7). Corruption has many forms, however, which can be
classified into five groups: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and favouritism (Andvig and
Fjeldstad, 2001, pp. 8-10).
Corruption has many negative economic, political and social consequences with the most
devastating impact on developing countries (Desta, 2006, p. 249; Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011). It has
a negative impact on economic development and growth (Transparency International, 2005; see
also UNDP, 1997). Corruption and other forms of bad governance bring about an unfavourable
institutional environment, which tends to block the development of endogenous entrepreneurship,
keep the levels of trust and social capital low, and make collective action difficult, thus eventually
making it hard to achieve changes in these critical institutional factors. These are fundamental
reasons why poor regions persistently stay poor (Millock and Olsen, 1993).
Corruption not only robs countries of their potential and afflicts most of the developing world; it
also adversely affects the poorest within societies, imposing the heaviest costs on those who can
least afford them (Transparent International, 2005). There is a need to remember that corruption and
other forms of bad governance may also imperil the functionality of social systems in the developed
world, of which there are numerous examples (Donahue, 2011; Henley, 2011).
Preconditions for the policies for clean governance
Corruption and other problems of bad governance have proved endemic worldwide. Nevertheless
the Global Corruption Report of 2005 still claims optimistically that corruption can be reduced
(Transparency International, 2005). There is even some evidence that there is overall progress in
improving the rule of law and good governance, in controlling corruption, and in improving
institutional quality in different parts of the world (Kaufmann, 2003; cf. Hanna et al. 2011).
6However, many experts have challenged optimistic views of the fight against corruption in light of
their observations and experiences. The lessons learnt so far are that policy decisions themselves
either have little impact on corruption or else they just work extremely slowly (Andvig and
Fjeldstad, 2001, p. 101; Caiden, 2013a; 2013b; see also Klitgaard, 1998; OECD, 2000, pp. 23-26,
58; McCusker, 2006; Matei and Matei, 2011).
As corruption is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, both its causes and consequences relate to major
social systems – that is, economic, political and socio-cultural systems - and institutional actors,
such as politico-administrative machinery, the business sector and civil society. Generally the
norms and values of politicians and public servants and general cultural views of the public sector
are important factors behind corruption (McCusker, 2006, p. 5). Culture may be an element that
decisively affects the level and acceptability of corruption. There are, for example, clear cultural
differences in the propensity to become engaged in corruption as well as to punish corrupt
behaviour (Cameron et al., 2005).
At least from the policy perspective the most important element in anti-corruption policy is the
political side of public governance and leadership in particular. As concluded by Abdulai (2009),
controlling corruption in a sustainable manner requires a consistent demonstration of genuine
commitment on the part of the political elite to the eradication of corruption. Where the
commitment  of  the  top  political  leadership  to  such  a  goal  is  weak,  governments  are  unlikely  to
engage in zero tolerance but continue to condone some degree of corruption.
Another important dimension is democracy. Santiso (2001, p. 2) argues that “the quality of
governance is ultimately attributable to its democratic content. Neither democracy nor good
governance is sustainable without the other. Consequently, democracy and good governance need to
converge, both conceptually and practically, in the study and practice of public policymaking.”
Bringing politics back into the picture requires that we strengthen accountability, enhance the rule
of law, and promote civic participation (Santiso, 2001; see also Caddy, 2001). At the same time it
should be noted that democratisation does not have statistically noticeable effects until it has lasted
for decades (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001; cf. Hanna et al., 2011).
There are new ideas about how to approach the design and implementation of anti-corruption and
good governance policies. Daniel Kaufmann (2003) of the World Bank has challenged the notion
that passing laws by fiat, creating new public institutions, or embarking on anti-corruption
campaigns are effective. Traditional public sector management doctrines and conventional judiciary
7reform approaches may not, after all, be that suitable, especially for most of the developing
countries and emerging economies. What is needed, instead, is a sharper focus on external
accountability, the development of transparency mechanisms and empirically-based monitoring
tools, as well as participatory ’voice’ and incentive-driven approaches to prevention. These should
play a prominent role in providing checks and balances on traditional public institutions, in
empowering non-traditional stakeholders, and in ameliorating state capacity and mitigating the very
unequal field of influence in countries striving for clean government (see Doig and Riley, 1998;
Tanzi, 1998; cf. Desta, 2006; Parnini, 2009; Hanna et al., 2011; Transparency International, 2009,
p. 9).
In  the  next  sections  we  will  discuss  two  cases,  Finland  and  Singapore,  which  will  help  to
understand the preconditions for successful anti-corruption policy developed in two different
contexts.
The Finnish model of good governance
Finland is well-known for its clean and transparent government. In the Corruption Perceptions
Index of Transparency International Finland has continuously ranked as one of the least corrupt
countries  in  the  world.  The  situation  is  much the  same in  all  the  Nordic  countries  (Transparency
International, 2004; see also OECD, 2000; 2002a; 2002b).
Finland’s clean governance model is a result of a long historical development, first under Swedish
rule  until  1809,  then  as  an  autonomous  Grand  Duchy  of  the  Russian  empire,  until  the  country
finally gained independence in 1917. Many practices in political life and administration have their
roots in traditional local customs and rule-making, which provided a legitimate basis for obedience
to the law. Generally, the underlying feeling has historically been, and to a large extent continues to
be that the law, as is the case with rules in general, is to be taken seriously (Joutsen and Keränen,
2009). Honesty and trustworthiness have likewise been perceived as virtues in Finnish culture,
which is not so common in many other European countries.
Ordinary Finns do not encounter corruption in their daily lives, which partly explains why the
majority of them trust their public institutions (Koskinen, 2003). In all the Nordic countries on a
yearly basis only some 1-2% of people have offered bribes in some form, the average in the EU
being 5%, in the Asia-Pacific area 10%, and Middle East and North Africa 40% (Transparency
International, 2009, p. 32). Part of this picture is also a well-developed legislation, which, it should
8be noted, has in the Finnish case never included either a separate corruption law or a separate
agency controlling corruption. Instead, corruption is treated as a part of poor governance and
criminality, and is thus handled at all levels of legislation and control systems, including the
Constitution, the penal code, the civil service legislation, administrative directives and ethical
norms (Tiihonen, 2003; OECD, 2000). This implies that the aspects of corruption are approached in
a holistic manner.
What explains the clean government in Finland? We may build an aggregate image of the reasons
for the low level of corruption in Finland on the basis of the following factors divided into six
thematic groups (Tiihonen, 2003; Joutsen and Keränen, 2009; Anttiroiko and Valkama, 2005;
Koskinen, 2003; OECD, 2000):
Culture and characteristics of society
1) High standard of living
2) Egalitarianism and fairly equal income distribution (large middle class)
3) Democratic mindset and the respect for the rule of law
4) Well-educated people
5) Universal welfare services and social benefits
6) Culture in which honesty and hard work are traditionally respected
The court system
7) Long and strong tradition of legality
8) Strong position of the Chancellor of Justice which has its roots in the 1700s and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, a position established in 1922. There are also auditors who
perform independent scrutiny of public administration, most notably the State Audit Office, a
national supervisory body that works in connection with Parliament and oversees the work of
state authorities.
9) Trust  in  and  easy  access  to  the  court  system and  police.  People  believing  that  corruption  has
influenced a decision affecting their rights can easily request a police inquiry.
Administrative structures and principles
10) Core administrative principles and values for  public service: legality, justice, independence,
impartiality, objectivity, trustworthiness of government, transparency, service-mindedness,
proportionality, and being purpose oriented
11) Flat hierarchical structures
912) Well-functioning system of local government based on local autonomy
Civil servants
13) Civil service has been highly regarded as a career
14) Everyone can aspire to a good career. In addition, civil service careers are based on merit
15) Adequate salary level in public administration
16) Well-educated civil servants in both central and local government
Decision-making and administrative procedures
17) Collective and collegiate decision-making structure
18) Non-political civil servants as the administrative heads of ministries (permanent secretaries
work along with the system of political state secretaries; the latter was introduced in the 2000s
to support the ministries in their work)
19) Referendary system in which a civil servant prepares the matter in question for resolution by a
decision-making body
20) Obligation to provide public argumentation for the reasons behind decisions
Politics and political parties
21) Consensus-oriented political culture (‘rainbow governments’)
22) Public funding of political parties
23) Special regulations concerning the amount and transparency of campaign funding
Culture and social conditions are the key factors in explaining the evolution of clean governance in
Finland. First of all, Finnish society is democratic and egalitarian. It was one of the first countries in
the world to grant all men and women the right to vote and stand for office. In addition, the standard
of living is high, which, together with fairly even income distribution, means that the level of wages
in both the public and the private sectors can be termed reasonable, leading to the emergence of a
fairly large middle class. These background factors also include an effective and inclusive system of
education. Such factors suggest that the Finnish public tend to have a relatively good capacity to
understand, exercise and safeguard their rights (Joutsen and Keränen, 2009, p. 13).
An important element of Finnish public administration is the impartiality and integrity of civil
servants.  A  special  manifestation  of  such  thinking  is  that  an  official  may  not  participate  in  the
taking of a decision which may benefit or, alternatively, harm his or her interests or those of another
person  with  whom he  or  she  has  a  dependent  relationship.  In  such  cases,  the  public  official  must
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withdraw from consideration of the matter. From a procedural point of view, the Finnish system is
based  on  what  is  known  as  the  referendary  system,  which  is  actually  an  old  pillar  of  public
administration (the ‘referendary’ is an official responsible for preparing official matters for a
decision-making body). It is also worth emphasising that the system is based on collective and
collegiate decision-making, which tends to diminish the likelihood of corruption. An important
dimension of all such administrative work is publicity and transparency (Joutsen and Keränen,
2009).
As Finnish culture and the administrative system support clean government in various ways, the law
enforcement and court system are not the major instance in the big picture of combatting corruption.
Yet, as in any society, they have their own critical role to play. (Joutsen and Keränen, 2009).
Finland is an interesting case of anti-corruption policy in the sense that by international standards its
anti-corruption measures and institutions are weak. It does not have a separate unit dedicated to the
investigation or prosecution of corruption-related offences. This reflects the fact that the guiding
principle for anti-corruption work is that corruption is not perceived as an isolated phenomenon,
and is therefore not deemed to require separate legal provisions or separate supervisory bodies, nor
even a separate strategy or action plan. Instead, anti-corruption measures are integrated into general
good governance policy grounded on the rule of law (Joutsen and Keränen, 2009).
Singapore’s road to good governance
Singapore is a unique case because, unlike most other Asian countries, it has been able to break
away from rampant corruption as a way of life. It is the most widely discussed Asian model due to
its unchallenged position as the least corrupt country in Asia (Quah, 2011, p. 133). In the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking of Transparency International (TI) it is at the level of the
Nordic countries (in 2011 its rank was 5). We could assume that other successful developmental
states, such as the former British colony Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea would have followed
suit. However, only Hong Kong (CPI rank 12 in 2011) and Japan (CPI rank 14 in 2011) are in some
respects close to the level of Singapore (Quah, 1988; Transparency International, 2009, p. 32). The
situation is much worse in other East Asian countries, those of Taiwan (CPI rank 32 in 2011), South
Korea (43), Macau (46), and China (75) not to mention South East Asian countries.
The fact that corruption is not a way of life in Singapore is an indication of the effectiveness of the
anti-corruption policy adopted by the People's Action Party (PAP) government after it took office in
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June 1959. The situation was completely different in colonial times. In fact, corruption was a part of
the everyday lives of Singaporeans during the colonial period, especially after the Second World
War (Quah, 1988). Among the first decisive steps towards clean government was the establishment
of  the  Corrupt  Practices  Investigation  Bureau  (CPIB)  in  the  early  1950s  as  the  independent  anti-
corruption agency, which was actually the first of its kind in the world (Quah, 2011, p. 133). This
turn was based on the initiative by the colonial government after a serious corruption case involving
the  police  and  the  unsatisfactory  situation  urged  special  attention.  In  spite  of  this,  corruption
continued to be rife throughout the sectors of public service, law enforcement being the most
corrupted one. Such a deplorable condition was due to inadequate legislation, widespread corrupt
practices, the inferior position of the poorly educated population in the eyes of the police and civil
servants, low salaries of civil servants and problems in recruiting officers for the anti-corruption
agency from the Singapore policy force on short secondment (Tan, 1999).
The newly-elected PAP government in the late 1950s was determined to eradicate corruption in
Singapore in general and in the civil service in particular. Its strategy for dealing with the problem
of corruption emphasised the necessity of reducing both the opportunities and the need for
corruption. From the beginning, top political leaders set themselves as role models for civil
servants,  divesting  themselves  of  commercial  ties,  demonstrating  high  work  ethics,  avoiding  any
behaviour that could be construed as abuse of their office, and showing zero tolerance for corrupt
behaviour.  By  personal  example  they  created  a  fruitful  soil  for  the  atmosphere  of  honesty  and
integrity (Tan, 1999).
The PAP government relied heavily on the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) and the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) to spearhead its anti-corruption strategy. The primary aim of
the POCA and CPIB was to reduce the opportunities for corruption and to increase the price to be
paid for corrupt behaviour if detected (Quah, 1988). In the late 1980s the essential pillars of
Singapore’s effective anti-corruption policy were in place and started to bear fruit. It was important
that the CPIB since its inception investigated and prosecuted many leading politicians and
bureaucrats, which was a sign to the whole of society of the determination to eradicate corruption
(Quah, 2007, p. 25).
An important part of the PAP strategy was to tackle the root cause of corruption in the civil service.
More than anything, this meant the constant improvement of salaries and working conditions. The
assumption was that corruption becomes a serious problem in social conditions where the civil
servants are generally paid very low salaries and where there is an unequal distribution of wealth.
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Accordingly, the salaries of Singaporean civil servants are fairly high by Asian standards (Quah,
1988). The same policy was adopted with politicians too. Top politicians have reiterated Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s mantra that political leaders should be paid the top salaries that they
deserve in order to ensure clean and honest government (Quah, 1988). This is a problematic issue in
countries like Singapore, for such an act can be interpreted as a “rent extraction” by a leader
insulated from democratic control (Di Tella and Fisman, 2004, p. 477; Adam, 2012).
In  all,  corruption  does  exist  in  Singapore,  as  it  does  in  all  societies  in  one  form  or  another,  but
Singapore is not a corrupt society. There are occasional incidents of corrupt behaviour, but such
cases are the exception rather than the rule, i.e. they represent individual cases of corruption rather
than symptoms of an endemic problem. In short, corruption is incidental and not institutionalised
(Quah, 1988).
Discussion: Learning from the Finnish and Singaporean development paths
Finland and Singapore represent interestingly very different kinds of success stories. Finland’s
approach is seemingly evolutionary by nature, whereas Singapore is more of a revolutionary case.
From a context-specific point of view they provide models for two different policies, which may be
useful when considering country-specific approaches to combatting corruption (cf. ‘monitoring and
incentives’ vs. ‘changing the rules of the game’ approaches to corruption, see Hanna et al., 2011).
We may actually use these two cases to build two ideal types of anti-corruption policy.  Finland’s
model, which is fairly similar to those found in Sweden, Denmark and Norway on the one hand, and
to some extent also countries of the British Commonwealth such as New Zealand and Australia on
the other, reflects the situation in the least corrupt countries in the Western world. Singapore’s
approach, in turn, which resembles Hong Kong and to a lesser extent Japan, represents the Asian
developmental state model. The ethics management models derived from these two cases and
contexts are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Two ethics management models: Finnish vs. Singaporean model.
Features
Evolutionary culture-based ethics
management model
Revolutionary compliance-based
ethics management model
Country group Western Asian
Example Finland Singapore
Background agenda Welfare and equality (social);
welfarism
Development and growth (economic);
developmentalism
Democracy Democratic system, free press, civic
liberties, multi-party system
Semi-authoritarian system (soft
authoritarianism), limited freedoms,
dominant-party system
Role of politics Political pluralism; consensual
institutional support for anti-
corruption policy
Personalised leadership; leading
politicians’ critical role in supporting
anti-corruption policy
Role of administration and anti-
corruption agency (ACA)
Clean, transparent administration; no
separate anti-corruption agency
Clean administration; special role of
strong anti-corruption agency
Major structural support for anti-
corruption policy
Cultural values and norms Political leadership and institutional
measures
Development of anti-corruption
policy
Evolutionary; piecemeal, integrated
policy
Revolutionary; masterminded anti-
corruption policy
Approach to anti-corruption policy Weak; holistic approach; no specific
anti-corruption policy or legislation
Strong; spearhead approach; anti-
corruption policy and anti-corruption
law have important role
Characteristic measures of anti-
corruption policy
Lenient measures: ethical and cultural
codes and principles, instructing,
internalisation of norms and values
Tough measures: investigation,
compliance, control, punishment
The role of culture, political leadership and administrative machinery are in a generative
relationship with each other, and interestingly, their combinations differ considerably in the two
cases  discussed  here.  In  Finland  tradition  and  culture  seem  to  be  key  to  good  governance.  In
addition, a strong and clean administrative machinery has become the backbone of the governance
system, not the political leadership or even legal provisions as such. Politics is rather the weakest
link in the chain. The case was more or less the opposite in Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s, when
the  new  anti-corruption  policy  was  in  the  making,  for  political  leadership  and  the  role  of  Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew in particular was decisive in the whole transformation process. In
Singapore the political leadership seemed to be the glue between cultural change and institutional
arrangements, which made the dramatic improvement possible during a fairly short historical period
(Quah, 2007, pp. 31, 36). Nevertheless it should be remembered that in Singapore the anti-
corruption policy is backed up by a vigilant public that is ready to report suspected corruption
(Quah, 2007, p. 36). As Tan (1999, p. 64) puts it, the cultural climate in Singapore is strongly
opposed to corruption.
If the clean administrative machinery has been and still is the key to Finnish good governance,
administrative measures have actually been equally important in Singapore, even if some contextual
differences are apparent.  First  of all,  the independence and power of the CPIB was decisive from
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the very beginning of gaining sovereignty, which was further strengthened by the law enacted soon
after. There is also need to emphasise that even if the CPIB is the investigative organ in the system,
the primary responsibility for preventive work and guidance is vested in the government
departments, which are required to take sufficient administrative actions to prevent corrupt practices
within their units (Tan, 1999).
It seems that the adequate level of civil servants’ salaries is the common denominator of both
Finland  and  Singapore.  Yet  closer  inspection  reveals  that  its  role  as  a  determinant  is  not  so  self-
evident in either case. Namely, in the Finnish case, public administration was not in a historical
perspective endemically corrupt even in the earlier historical ‘constitutional state’ period with
generally low wages in public administration. According to an old Finnish saying, “a public
official’s bread may be thin, but at least it is long”, meaning that there is good job security to
counterbalance rather modest remuneration. In the case of Singapore, respectively, the PAP
government had succeeded in curbing corruption from the 1950s to the early 1970s, a time before a
significant rise in salaries, mainly by ensuring that the CPIB enforced the anti-corruption law
effectively and impartially (Quah, 2007, p. 28). Paradoxically, subsequent pay rises were not only
motivated by stemming the brain drain from the civil service to the private sector but can also be
seen as a way for the political and bureaucratic elite to make excessive personal gains legitimated
by the commitment to anti-corruption policy (see The Economist, 2010; Adam, 2012).
These two cases point to clear fundamental differences in anti-corruption policy: in a semi-
authoritarian society like Singapore strong leadership and an efficient anti-corruption agency are
necessary conditions for successful policy and related cultural change. In the Finnish case the
relationship is the reverse: the cultural background facilitates non-corrupt procedures which rely on
transparency and democratic values.
Conclusion
It seems that historical, cultural and structural contexts have a considerable effect on the success of
anti-corruption policy. Finland and Singapore are among the most successful countries in terms of
combatting corruption, but their historical and cultural conditions are very different, as are also their
approaches and roads to clean government. Finland clearly represents an evolutionary case with
low-profile  anti-corruption  policy,  whereas  Singapore  is  a  revolutionary  case  with  an  array  of
institutionalised anti-corruption measures. This implies that there is no universal success recipe in
curbing corruption, but rather culture-specific processes which may vary considerably. However,
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there are also some common denominators in both cases, which can be summarised as follows.
First, anti-corruption policy and institutions must be created so as to take maximum advantage of
local history and culture. Anti-corruption policy is likely to be successful if people are educated and
civil society is vigilant and empowered. Lastly, the administrative machinery must be made clean
by systematically eliminating opportunities for corrupt behaviour within it.
In the pursuit of clean governance, especially in the short term, the support of top political leaders, a
clear anti-corruption policy and a strong anti-corruption agency may be necessary, as exemplified
by the case of Singapore. These do not, however, explain the cleanness of governments as such, as
evidenced by the case of Finland. This compels us to consider whether institutional measures
should be accompanied by careful consideration of the historical and socio-cultural nature of the
context in which any anti-corruption policy is adopted, and an even more careful match between
institutional measures and socio-cultural conditions in order to generate synergistic effects from
both the carrots and sticks built into the anti-corruption policy.
Lastly, it needs to be remembered that it is difficult to transfer organisational or structural methods
that operate efficiently in one country to another context (Heilbrunn, 2004). Setting up an anti-
corruption agency and taking compliance-based administrative measures seem to be a fast track
strategy and fairly feasible, but the implementation may be impeded by various  considerations, not
least by silent opposition from leading politicians, local elites and top bureaucrats. There are also
structural methods, such as high salaries for politicians and civil servants, that are technically easy
to implement, but require a certain level of prosperity and political will, which remain unattainable
in  most  of  the  developing  countries.  The  most  challenging  strategy  would  build  on  actions  that
contribute directly to building a “clean culture”.  This, however, is time-consuming and requires
broad-based institutional support. Even if there is evidence of difficulty in enacting meaningful anti-
corruption policies and implementing them (Heilbrunn, 2004; see also Quah, 2008; Kim, 2008),
success stories may be an important source of inspiration, guidance and legitimation in countries
that have demonstrated their commitment to structural transformations towards clean governance.
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